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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER 42
U.S.C. SECTION 1983-City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S.
Ct. 2427, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 16 (interim ed. 1985).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Municipal.immunity from tort liability for governmental policy decisions' is based on the need for governmental officers to make decisions free from fear of civil liability2 and the need to safeguard the
public purse from depletion in order to provide important governmental
services.3 In light of the conflict that emerges when sovereign immunity
bars recovery to an individual who has been harmed by the municipality,4 the soundness of these rationales is questionable. 5
Congress provided redress for harms inflicted at the hands of the
municipalities in the Civil Rights Act of 18716. In the predecessor of
section 1983, Congress established a cause of action for individuals
whose constitutional rights are infringed by governmental action. 8 AlI. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1046-56 (W. Keeton 5th
student ed. 1984) (discussing the history of governmental tort immunity for basic policy reasons
from its origins in sovereign immunity) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
2. The official immunity is justified by two dependent lines of reasoning:
(I ) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer
who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the
decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
3. See CONG. GLOBE. 42nd Cong., Ist Sess. 798-99 (1871) (Representative Farnsworth
from Illinois was concerned that if a city could be liable for property damages and personal injuries caused by persons acting in a riotous manner within the city's boundaries when the riotous
persons' actions infringed on constitutional rights of innocent bystanders, a city's treasury may be
greatly depleted and it is possible that a city's courthouse could be levied and sold by the federal
government.). See also Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1924).
Borchard cites Board of Comm'rs v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109 (1857), for support of the proposition that "public moneys raised by taxation for public use cannot lawfully be applied to the liquidation of damages caused by the torts of officers." Id. at 133 n.197.
4. See Case Comment, The Demise of Municipal Immunity Under Section 1983: Owen v.
City of Independence, 14 GA. L. REV. 605 (1980).
5. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 645-56 (1980).
6. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
7. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
While section 1983 does not create any separate rights, it does provide remedies for enforcement of rights arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Howard v. State Dep't
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though section 1983 is the result of the post-civil war Congress, the
ever growing vitality of the statute is evidenced by recent court decisions. 9 Amenability to suit under section 1983 has been the subject of
much litigation. 10 Each decision by the United States Supreme Court
further defines the contours of section 1983 liability.
This casenote will examine the scope of section 1983 cases in light
of City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle" in which the Uhited States Supreme Court held that a single incident of misconduct by a municipal
employee is not sufficient proof of a municipal policy as the cause of
injury to a plaintiff so as to render the municipality amenable to suit
under section 1983.12 This casenote will also analyze the status of section 1983 through subsequent interpretations of Tuttle.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDINGS

In Tuttle, the Court did not find Oklahoma City liable for the
misconduct of one of its police officers who shot Albert Tuttle while
responding to a report that a robbery was in progress.1 3 In October of
1980, police officer Julian Rotramel, a ten-month veteran of the
Oklahoma City police force, responded to a bulletin indicating that a
robbery was in progress at a local bar.14 The person who made the
phone call which was the source of the bulletin described a man who fit
Tuttle's description and who possessed a gun.1 5 The events from this
point become unclear. Officer Rotramel's version of the incident is that
when he entered the bar, Tuttle approached Officer Rotramel and the
officer detained Tuttle asking Tuttle to stay within the bar." Rotramel
then questioned the barmaid who informed him that no robbery had
8
occurred.17 Tuttle attempted to break free from the officer's grasp.

of Highways, 478 F.2d 581, 585 (10th Cir. 1973).
9. Courts now hold that the rights which come under the ambit of section 1983 protection
include those rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 1964). See Blunt v. Marion County School Bd., 515 F.2d
951, 962 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that section 1983 allowed plaintiff to bring a cause of action for
violation of plaintiffs right to procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment). See also
Slate v. McFetridge, 484 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that section 1983 allowed
plaintiff to bring a cause of action for violation of the first amendment protections of plaintiff's
free speech and assembly); Ames v. Vavreck, 356 F. Supp. 931, 939 (D. Minn. 1973) (holding
that plaintiff may bring a cause of action under section 1983 for administrative negligence).
10. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2429 (1985) ("Today we take a
small but necessary step toward defining [section 19831 contours.").
I1. Id. at 2427.
12. Id. at 2436-37.
13. Id. at 2441.
14. Id. at 2429.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2430.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/11
17. Id.
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Finally, Tuttle broke away from Rotramel and ignoring the officer's
demands to halt, went outside. 9 Rotramel observed Tuttle reach for his
boot and fearing for his own safety, fired his gun, fatally wounding
Tuttle. 20 Later, at the hospital, a toy gun was found wedged between
2
Tuttle's boot and leg. 1
Tuttle's widow brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Rotramel individually and against the city of Oklahoma City alleging that
Oklahoma City's "custom or policy" deprived Tuttle of his constitutional rights.2 2 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the officer but
found the city liable, awarding damages of $1.5 million after having
been given an instruction that the jury could summize from a single
incident of unusually excessive use of force that the actions of the officer were "attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to 'deliberate indifference' or 'gross negligence' on the part of the
23
officials in charge.
Oklahoma City appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit which affirmed the district court's decision .2 The petitioner
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court which reversed,
holding that evidence of a single incident by a municipal employee is
not sufficient to prove that the misconduct represented an official municipal policy so as to support a section 1983 claim. 5

III.

BACKGROUND

The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was enacted to provide citizens of
the United States with a civil action for the deprivation of constitutionally protected rights.2 6 In 1961, the United States Supreme Court con7
sidered the scope of section 1983 in Monroe v. Pape.1
The Monroe
Court concluded that based on the legislative history of section 1983,

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2431 (emphasis omitted).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2436.
26. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
27. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), rev'd in part, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978). This action was brought against the city of Chicago and thirteen of its police officers.
Id. at 169. Plaintiffs alleged that their rights were violated when the police officers broke into and
ransacked their home and then detained and interrogated Mr. Monroe for ten hours without formally charging him. Id. After examining the congressional intent with respect to section 1983, the
United States Supreme Court held that the police were amenable to civil suit, but the city was
immune
civil suit. 1986
Id. at 192.
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plaintiffs had no cause of action against the City of Chicago. 8
The status of municipal immunity changed drastically in 1978
when the Supreme Court reversed Monroe in Monell v. Department of
Social Services 9 and held that municipalities were "persons" under
section 1983 and therefore amenable to civil suit.30 In Monell, the
Court held that municipalities could be held liable for the wrongful
acts of their employees when the employees act pursuant to an official
policy or custom. 3 1 The municipal liability upheld in Monell is not
based on a theory of respondeatsuperior; instead, it is based on actions
that arise directly from governmental policy. 32 The plaintiff must
charge that the officers or employees of the municipality acted pursuant to a policy or custom rather than on their own initiative. 3 The
Monell Court interpreted the rejection of the Sherman Amendment to
the Civil Rights Act of 1871"' as a simple refusal to impose municipal
liability for wrongs of individuals who are municipal employees. 3 Although Monell did not affect abrogation of municipal immunity from
section 1983 suits based on respondeat superior, a "fault-based analysis" emerged for the imposition of municipal liability. 6
The elements of a section 1983 action defined in Monell are: (1)

28. Determination of legislative intent was based primarily on the rejection of the Sherman
Amendment which was proposed at the time of the statute's passage. The Sherman Amendment
would have made municipalities liable for damages to the property or person of their inhabitants
caused by private persons "riotously and tumultously assembled." Id. at 188 n.38. The Court
interpreted this rejection to indicate "that Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of [section 1983]." Id. at 187. For a discussion of the amendment, see
Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413,
1464-69 (1975).
29. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Plaintiffs, female employees of New York City, alleged that defendants, the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education, had, as a matter of
official policy, compelled pregnant employees to take leaves of absence before *uch leaves were
required for medical reasons. Id. at 660-61.
Monell overrules Monroe only insofar as it holds local governments are not wholly immune
from suit under section 1983. Id. at 663. "However, we do uphold Monroe v. Pape insofar as it
holds that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for rendering municipalities liable
under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of their employees." Id. at 663 n.7.
30. Id. at 658.
31. Id. at 690.
32. Id. at 663. "IThe action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a
policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body's officers." Id. at 690.
33. Id. at 692. See also Reese v. Milwaukee County Sheriff's Dep't, 505 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.
Wis. 1980).
34. Id. at 690. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 668. "A fresh analysis of debate ... and particularly of the case law . . . shows
. . .that Monroe incorrectly equated the 'obligation' of which Representative Poland spoke of
with 'civil liability.' " Id. at 665.
36. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2434 (1985).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/11
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the plaintiff must identify the challenged policy or custom;"7 (2) plaintiff must attribute the policy or custom to the municipality;3 8 (3) the
plaintiff must show a causal connection between the execution of the
policy and the injury suffered; 9 and (4) the plaintiff must have been
subjected to a deprivation of a constitutional right."' The touchstone of
section 1983 is the deprivation caused by unconstitutional official policy.' 1 The policy may be an unarticulated policy or custom that has
the
force of official policy. 42 In order to satisfy section 1983 the official
policy or custom must also be the "moving force of the constitutional
violation."'43

Prior to 1980, a municipality could assert a good faith defense to
section 1983 claims so long as the officer did not know or reasonably
could not have known that the action taken while in his official role
would violate the constitutional rights of the person." A municipality
could also assert a good faith defense if the officer did not take action
with the malicious intent to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights
or other injury.' 5 The United States Supreme Court abolished this good
faith defense in Owen v. City of Independence46 in which the Court
held that regardless of fault, a municipality is not immune from liability for an injury caused by a constitutional violation committed by the
municipality's officers.' 7 The good faith defense rested on qualified immunity for "ministerial" activities which has not been supported by
tradition or reason.' 8 Additional support for the abolition of the good
faith defense may be found in the principles underlying the enactment
of section 1983-the protection of those persons wronged by abuse of

37. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976).
41. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-27 (1981).
42. See Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (D. Conn. 1978).
43. Polk County, 454 U.S. at 326 (quoting the Court in Monell); Black v. Stephens, 662
F.2d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 1981).
44. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
45. Id.
46. 445 U.S. 622 (1980). Petitioner, the city's chief of police, was discharged during
the
course of an investigation for wrongful activities within the police department. Id. at
629. No
reason was given for the dismissal. Id. The chief of police brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983
against the city, claiming his discharge violated his constitutional right of due process. Id.
at 630.
The Supreme Court held that the municipality had no immunity under § 1983 and could
not
assert a good faith defense. Id. at 638.
47. Id. at 657.
48. Id. at 644. "In sum, we can discern no 'tradition so well grounded in history and reason'
that would warrant the conclusion that in enacting § I of the Civil Rights Act, the 42d Congress
sub silentio extended to municipalities a qualified immunity based on the good faith of their
officers." Id. at 650.
Published
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governmental authority .4 To allow broad immunity thwarts the purpose of section 1983.
With recognition of municipal liability for injuries inflicted pursuofficial policy, a question arises as to what constitutes "policy"
to
ant
under section 1983. In deciding Tuttle, the United States Supreme
Court addressed this threshold question.
IV.

ANALYSIS

50
In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, the United States Supreme
Court refused to impose liability upon a municipality under section
1983 based solely on evidence of a single incident of misconduct by a
municipal employee.5 1 The Court found that the trial court's jury instructions were flawed because they allowed the jury to make a determination of the existence of official policy based solely on evidence of a
single incident of misconduct. 52 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the
54
plurality, 53 based his rejection of the jury instructions on the unwar5
ranted inferences a jury could make in cases such as Tuttle.
The Court ruled that the jury instructions would allow "a § 1983
plaintiff to establish liability without submitting proof of a single action
' '5
taken by a municipal policymaker.

'

This inference would consitute

respondeat superior liability rather than the direct fault-based liability
57
recognized in Monell v. Department of Social Services. The Monell
Court provided that in order to find a municipality liable under section
1983 it is necessary that "the action . . . alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or
58
decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers."

49. Id. at 650-51 (The purpose of section 1983 was to provide protection to those harmed
under state law by those whose actions were made possible by virtue of the power vested in them
by state law.).
50. 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985).
51. Id. at 2436.
52. Id. at 2435.
53. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and O'Connor
in part IIIof the opinion which scrutinized the jury instructions. Id. at 2429. Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Id. at 2437. Justice
Powell took no part in this decision. Id.
54. The jury instruction stated that "a single, usually excessive use of force may be sufficiently out of the ordinary to warrant an inference that it was attributable to inadequate training
or supervision amounting to 'deliberate indifference' or 'gross negligence' on the part of the officials in charge." Id. at 2438 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment) (citing
Appellant's Brief at 44).
55. Id. at 2435.
56. Id.
57. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
58. Id. at 690 (The Court held that Congress intended to include a municipality as a suitahttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/11
ble 'person' under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and reversed part of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
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From this foundation, three elements must be established for the imposition of municipal liability in section 1983 actions for a constitutional
violation. First, the challenged policy or custom must be identified.5 9
Second, the custom or policy must be attributed to the city. 0 Finally, a
causal connection must be shown to exist between the execution of that
policy and the injury.61
A municipality may not be sued for the wrongful acts of its em62
ployees solely under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
A city is not
liable for the misconduct of a individual officer, acting on his own,
solely because he is in the city's employ. This application would place
too great a burden on the municipality and could not be justified by
examination of congressional intent.6 3
A section 1983 action also requires a plaintiff to "demonstrate an
'affirmative link' between the misconduct of the individual officer
and
some policy, express or implied, which has been adopted or authorized
by the City."'' It is not sufficient that the misconduct occurred while
the police officer was carrying out duties imposed upon him by an official policy. The plaintiff must establish a causal nexus between the policy and the misconduct. The result of the causal nexus requirement is a
fault-based analysis for imposing liability upon the municipality.6 5 The
city may be held liable "only for the constitutional violations resulting
from the municipality's official policy."6 6
The jury instructions given in Tuttle failed to ensure fault-based
analysis since it allowed the jury to make two impermissible assumptions.67 First, the instructions permitted the jury simply to assume that
the police misconduct at issue stemmed from inadequate training.6 8
Second, the instructions allowed the jury to assume from a single un-

59. Id. at 694. This may amount to "a course of action consciously chosen from among
various alternatives." Tuttle. 105 U.S. at 2436. Policy has also been defined as "something which
has been officially adopted." Mariani v. City of Pittsburgh, 624 F. Supp. 506, 509 (W.D. Pa.
1985). Custom has been defined as a practice which is so widespread, well settled, and permanent
that it rises to the level of an accepted policy. Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 844 (5th
Cir. 1984). "[EJxecution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that
the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Monell. 436 U.S. at 694.
60. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 691.
63. "[Tjhe language of § 1983, read against the background of the same legislative history,
compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action
pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Id.
64. Mariani, 624 F. Supp. at 509 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 432 U.S. 362, 371 (1976)).
65. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2433-34 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 658).
66. Id. at 2436 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 658).
67. Id. at 2435-36.
at 2435.
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usually excessive act that municipal policymakers had been grossly
negligent. 69 If allowed, these assumptions would amount to imposing
liability simply because of the employment relationship. The United
States Supreme Court reversed because it was unable to discern
based upon the impermissible inferwhether the jury imposed liability
70
instructions.
the
by
ence allowed
A.

Two Types of Policy

The Tuttle court identified two types of municipal policy, one of
which must exist for the plaintiff to assert a section 1983 claim. 7' First,
there may be an express policy which, in and of itself, violates the
rights of the victim. 7 2 When this type of policy is found, there need
only be one application of the custom or policy to constitute an actionable violation of the statute.7 3 To achieve redress, it is necessary only to
establish the policy's existence and to establish the policy's application.7 4 The policy at issue in Monell is an excellent example of this type
of policy. The policy of issuing mandatory leaves of absence before
medically necessary was unconstitutional on its face.7 5 Since the express policy itself was unconstitutional, any injury resulting from its
application was automatically a deprivation of Constitutional rights by
an official policy.
The second type of policy which the court may find in a section
1983 case includes an express policy which is constitutional on its face
and also an unarticulated policy which effects a constitutional violation.
Plaintiffs attempting to prove the existence of this kind of policy must
meet the greater evidentiary burden placed upon them by the Supreme
Court7 6 because this type of policy is more removed from the constitu-

69. Id. at 2436. The jury had been instructed that the municipality could not be held liable
if the municipality's policymakers were "merely . . . 'negligent' in establishing training policies,
but . . . they must have been guilty of 'gross negligence' or 'deliberate indifference' to the 'police
misconduct' that they could thus engender." Id. at 2435. In examining the instructions as a whole
the Court stated: "There is nothing elsewhere in this charge that would detract from the jury's
perception that it could impose liability based solely on this single incident." Id.
70. Addressing the contention by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit that independent evidence supported the decision of the jury, the Supreme Court concluded: "The fact that in
this case respondent introduced independent evidence of inadequate training makes no difference,
because the instruction allowed the jury to impose liability even if it did not believe respondent's
expert at all." Id.
71. Id. at 2435-36.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2436.
74. Id. ("To establish a constitutional violation in Monell no evidence was needed other
...).
than a statement of the policy by the municipal corporation, and its exercise.
75. See id. at 2435; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1973).
76. Tuttle argued that the injuries complained of resulted from a policy of inadequate trainhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/11
ing for officers. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2435.
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tional violation. 77 In Tuttle, the plaintiff alleged the "city's policy of
training and supervising police officers . . . resulted in inadequate
training, and the constitutional violations alleged. ' 78 In arguing a section 1983 violation based upon a this type of policy, a plaintiff is faced
with the problem of establishing the causal connection. The mere fact
that the training the officers received was inadequate does not itself
violate the rights of the injured party. One may perceive the gap in
causation which exists between the decision to pursue a training program that turned out to be inadequate and the harm which may be
inflicted by those who go through the training program. This gap in
causation is quite unlike the decision to impose a mandatory leave of
absence before medically necessary, which directly effects the
employee.
An additional difficulty lies within the definition which the United
States Supreme Court gives to policy-that which "implies a course of
action consciously chosen from among various alternatives. ' 79 Under
this definition, the plaintiff in a section 1983 action must show that an
inadequate training program was the product of the policymakers' conscious choice.8 0 It is not sufficient to prove a constitutional tort and
allow a mere inference that the injury was the product of the policymakers' conscious choice. The plaintiff must go forward with proof of
the conscious choice made by the governmental entity.
The requirement that the plaintiff prove that the city consciously
pursued a policy of inadequate training provides a limit upon the liability exposure of the municipality for injuries which occur under a
facially constitutional policy. 81 If conscious choice need not be proved,
almost any action by a municipal employee which harms someone
could eventually be traced back to a municipal policy.82 Contrary to
Monell, this absence of a stated policy would allow the municipality to
be held liable solely by virtue of an employment relationship and without regard to the municipality's fault. 83

77. "[T]he 'policy' that respondents seek to rely upon is far more nebulous, and a good deal
further removed from the constitutional violation, than was the policy in Monell." Id. at 2436.
"[l1t is therefore difficult in one sense even to accept the submission that someone pursues a
'policy' of 'inadequate training ....
Id.
78. Id. at 2434.
79. Id. at 2436.
80. Id. ("[T]hat is, proof that the policymakers deliberately chose a training program which
would prove inadequate.").
81. Id. ("[S]ome limitation must be placed on establishing municipal liablity through policies that are not themselves unconstitutional ....
").
82. Id. ("[Flor example, Rotramel would never have killed Tuttle if Oklahoma City did not
have a 'policy' of establishing a police force.").
83. Id. ("At the very least there must be an affirmative link between the policy and the
particular
constitutional violation
Published
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The instructions given to the jury in Tuttle permitted the jury to
infer from evidence of a single act of misconduct by a municipal employee that there was an unarticulated official policy of constitutionally
inadequate training and that the policy was the result of gross negli8 ' The
gence or deliberate indifference by municipal policymakers
United States Supreme Court held that where the plaintiff relies on
employee misconduct to establish the existence of policy, "considerably
more proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to
establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality and
the causal connection between the 'policy' and the constitutional deprivation."8 In so holding, the Supreme Court established that in section
1983 claims seeking the imposition of liability on municipalities, the
plaintiff's proof must go directly toward showing fault of municipal
policymakers, not merely injury inflicted by municipal employees.
B.

Cases Subsequent to Tuttle

In Grandstaff v. City of Borger,86 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held the city of Borger, Texas, amenable to suit based on
87
a policy inferred from the conduct of the city's police department.
The court determined that "[a]n 'inadequate' training program alone"
is not usually sufficient to constitute the moving force of the constitutional violation and based its decision to hold the municipality liable on
88
the dangerous recklessness that was attributable to a city policy.
The requirement of an affirmative link between the policy and the
injury suffered is satisfied when police officers know at the time they
act that their use of deadly force, in conscious disregard of the rights
and safety of innocent third parties, will meet with the approval of the
city policymakers 9 The Grandstaffcourt found that the actions of the
night shift were a reflection of a departmental policy or custom of gross
negligence and disregard for human life."0
Grandstaff may be distinguished from Tuttle on several grounds.

84. Id. at 2435.
85. Id. at 2436 (footnotes omitted).
86. 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985). The entire night shift of the Borger police department,
comprised of six police officers, became involved in the high-speed pursuit of a pickup truck driven
by a suspected criminal. Id. at 165. The police fired their weapons several times during the chase.
Id. When a pickup truck approached from the gravel ranch road down which the suspect had fled,
officers opened fire from both sides. Id. The driver, who was fatally shot in the back as he
emerged, was not the suspect but was rather a ranch foreman who had come to investigate and
assist. Id. at 165.
87. Id.at 171.
88. Id.at 169.
89. Id.at 171 (Reprimands, discharges, admissions of error, or changes in policy were not
issued after the incident.).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/11
90. Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Grandstaffobserved that
the entire night shift took part in the incident at the ranch.9 1 A department-wide policy or custom of acting with reckless disregard may be
inferred by the participation of the entire night shift.92 This case does
not present the classic one-bad-apple problem, consequently, holding
the municipality liable for the wrongful acts of the entire night shift
cannot be labeled as a simple case of respondeat superior.93 Thus,
when the shift acts as a whole, a policy may be inferred from the uniformity of action by considering the totality of the circumstances in
identifying the existence of a departmental policy.9" Subsequent conduct also may be an appropriate factor to consider, for it may say more
about existing departmental policy then do numerous prior incidents. 95
In addition, Grandstaff differs from Tuttle in representing not a
single incident but several incidents of police misconduct, pursuant to a
policy or custom occurring in one night."6 The acts of misconduct on
the night in question were numerous, beginning with the shootout during a high-speed chase. In other words, the "incident" was not simply
the shooting of Grandstaff. Instead, the police force's misconduct was
comprised of several incidents within a certain time frame. 97
The Grandstaff approach has been followed by other federal
courts. In Kibbe v. City of Springfield," the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit stated that "properly trained officers would avoid certain
techniques" which were inappropriately employed. 99 Conversely, inade-

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. "The evidence does prove repeated acts of abuse on this. night, by several officers in
several episodes, tending to prove a disposition to disregard human life and safety so prevalent as
to be police policy or custom." Id. "If prior policy had been violated, we would expect to see a
different reaction." Id. "[TIhe subsequent acceptance of [the] dangerous recklessness by the policymaker tends to prove his preexisting disposition and policy." Id.
94. Id. ("An injured plaintiff is not likely to document proof of a policy or disposition ...
The disposition must be inferred circumstantially from conduct of the officers and of the
policymaker.").
95. "This reaction to so gross an abuse of the use of deadly weapons says more about the
existing disposition of the City's policymaker than would a dozen incidents where individual officers employed excessive force." Id.
96. Id. (The Tuttle Court held "that isolated instances of police misbehavior are inadequate
to prove the knowledge and acquiescence by a city policymaker in that manner of conduct. That is
not our case, however.").
97. Id.
98. 777 F.2d 801 (Ist Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3598 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1986)
(No. 85-1217). This case involved a man who violated a restraining order, abducted a woman, and
led police on a car chase that ended when he was shot in the head. Id. at 802-03. The police took
him to the hospital but did not tell doctors of the possible gunshot wound. Id. at 803. After being
notified of the suspect's serious condition, the doctors then looked for a bullet wound. Id. The
suspect died a short while later. Id.
Published99.
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quately trained officers are more likely to violate-a person's constitutional rights such that an affirmative link may be shown between the
100 The court further
inadequate training and harmful police practices.
stated that as a matter of law, the actions of police officers, ocurring in
a single evening, may provide grounds for a claim under section
1983.101 Establishing the existence or nonexistence of an affirmative
link between the policy and the injury is the key to determining liability. The Grandstaff approach satisfies the Tuttle insistence that the focus of inquiry and proof be the direct fault of the municipality, not the
infliction of harm by a municipal employee.
In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,"°2 the United States Supreme
Court was faced with a variation of the Tuttle question-whether evidence of a single incident can ever be sufficient to demonstrate a consti03
tutionally deficient official policy for a section 1983 claim.' The Court
noted that the requirement established in Monell that injury to a plaintiff must have been inflicted pursuant to official policy before liability
could be imposed on a municipality was specifically "intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the muncipality."1' 0 4 The Court explained that a decision to follow a particular
course of action and made by an authorized policymaker is an act of
the municipality which constitutes official policy even though the deci05
sion is intended to apply only to a specific set of circumstances.1 The
Court accepted the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit that under Ohio law, the county prosecutor was authorized to
establish county policy and "was acting as the final decisionmaker for
the county" with respect to the incident.' 06 The county could therefore

100. Id.
101. Id. at 806. "There was no instruction here equivalent to the one in Tuttle allowing a
jury to infer a policy solely from the occurrence of the harm." Id. at 805.
102. 106 S. Ct. 1292 (interim ed. 1986).
103. Plaintiff Pembaur was, at the time of the incident, under indictment for welfare fraud
in the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, Ohio. Id. at 1294. Two Hamilton County
deputy sheriffs were directed to serve capiases for the arrest of two of Pembaur's employees who
had failed to answer subpoenas to testify in front of the grand jury. Id. The sheriffs were denied
entrance to Pembaur's office, and Cincinnati police officers were called. Id. The city police supervisor was contacted, as was the assistant county prosecutor who telephoned the county prosecutor.
After the prosecutor's instructions to "go in" were relayed to them, the officers broke down the
door, searched Pembaur's office, and seized two individuals. Id. at 1295. One day after Pembaur
filed this action under section 1983, this type of forced entry without a search warrant was found
in a different case to violate the fourth amendment. Id. (citing Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204 (1981)).
104. Id. at 1298.
105. Id. at 1300 (Emphasizing the deliberate consciousness of choice which must be involved, the Court parenthetically cited the Tuttle statement that "'policy' generally implies a
course of action chosen from among various alternatives.").
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/11
106. Id.at 1301.
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be held liable for the deprivation of constitutional rights effected pursuant to the policy established by the prosecutor. 10 7
Although municipal liability was imposed for policy established on
the basis of a single incident in Pembaur, the decision refines rather
than conflicts with Tuttle. Whereas official policy could not be demonstrated by evidence of a single incident of employee misconduct, official
policy may be demonstrated by a single deliberate decision, made by
the final decisionmaker, to follow a particular course of action in a
given situation. In both cases, the focus is on fault at the policy-making
level, not on injury inflicted by an employee.
C. Tuttle Reviewed and Refined
Tuttle involved a single incident and a single officer; 0 8 Grandstaff
involved several incidents and several officers; 109 Pembaur involved a
single incident and an official authorized to establish policy." 0 The distinctions between Tuttle, in which the municipality was not held liable,
and subsequent cases in which municipalities were held liable, suggest
the principles underlying imposition of municipal liability in 1983 actions. The jury instructions may not allow an inference of policy solely
from the occurrence of the harm."' Evidence of the policy itself must
be presented. This presentation may take the form of evidence of actions either before or after the injury," 2 or evidence that the action
reflected a policy decision by an authorized policymaker. "1 These
facts allow the jury to make entirely permissible inferences of unarticulated policy based on actions at a policymaking level rather than on the
mere occurrence of harm." 4
V.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, the existence of municipal liability under section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has become firmly established.
One fundamental requirement of section 1983 is the establishment of a
municipal policy or custom that is the moving force behind the
107. Id.
108. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. at 2430. See Kibbe, 777 F.2d at 805 ("Tuttle involved one officer
who fired one shot.").
109. Grandstaff, 767 F.2d at 171.
110. Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1292.
Ill. See Kibbe. 777 F.2d at 805 (The district court went so far as to instruct the jury that
-[a]n incident of excessive force on the part of police officers, standing by itself, is insufficient to
find the City of Springfield liable under section 1983.").
112. See Grandstaff. 767 F.2d at 171.
113. See Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1292.
114. See Kibbe, 777 F.2d at 805 ("Tuttle does not prevent a jury from drawing inferences
from the police officers' alleged misconduct, but simply requires that those inferences be based on
more than just the fact that plaintiff was hurt at the hands of a police officer.").
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harm.11 5 However, the limits as to what may be classified as a policy or
custom have been a gray area. Recently, federal courts have been looking past the misconduct itself to determine the existence of policy. The
Supreme Court, in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,"'6 has identified
two distinct types of policy which may be at work in a section 1983
action.117 If the policy is unconstitutional by its express terms, less evidence is necessary to establish a section 1983 claim. 1 8 If the express
policy is constitutional, evidence of constitutionally deficient custom or
implied policy is required and an inference of policy may not be made
based solely on the existence of harm.' 1 9 This approach is consistent
with the intent of section 1983, which is to provide redress for the harm
for which a municipality is directly responsible, while not punishing the
city by virtue of an employment relationship. A fault-based approach
emerges in which municipal liability attaches only on evidence of official policy as determined through a fact-sensitive analysis.
James A. Candelmo

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985).
Id. at 2435-36.
Id.
Id. at 2436.
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